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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case. No. 890231 
Category No. 13 
vs. : 
CHAD A. GARDINER, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State's attempt to assert defendant's lack of 
standing should be summarily disregarded because this issue 
was raised for the first time on appeal. Even if the Court 
considers the standing issue, under Rakas v. Illinois and 
Jones v. United States, defendant has standing because he was 
legitimately on the premises with the permission of his 
father, and he has an expectancy of privacy due to his ties to 
the business. 
The chief issue presented in this appeal: the right 
to forcibly resist an unlawful search of an area protected by 
the Fourth Amendment is governed by State v. Bradshaw, 541 
P,2d 800 (Utah 1975) The Bradshaw court recognized and 
affirmed the common law rule that one can use force to resist 
an unlawful arrest. The State's attempt to distinguish 
Bradshaw as dicta ignores the fact that the language 
"regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the arrest" 
was central to the Court's decision, Bradshaw is therefore 
dispositive to this appeal. 
Moreover, the Court should not modify Bradshaw due to 
considerations of expediency. Bradshaw and the common law 
rule stand for the proposition that a law abiding citizen 
should not be punished for refusing to acquiesce in an illegal 
search. The rule prevents an officer acting illegally from 
goading a citizen into a crime, which, if the officer had 
acted legally, would not have occurred * 
Even if the Court modifies the right to resist an 
unlawful search to the Elson rule, the defendant is entitled 
to a judgment of acquittal because the officer, used 
unnecessary force. Specifically, the officer failed to 
verbally warn the defendant of the consequences of his refusal 
to allow the officer to enter the building before using 
force. The officer resorted to force immediately and without 
provocation thereby causing the incident. Under Elson^ 
defendant's use of force is justified because the officer used 
force when unnecessary. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE'S FAILURE TO DISTINGUISH STATE V. BRADSHAW 
REQUIRES REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT APPELLANT'S CONVICTION AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
A. State waived its objection to defendant's standing 
by failing to raise the objection at trial. 
The State concedes that the Court of Appeals correctly 
held that the officer's warrantless entry into the Dinaland 
Aviation hanger was illegal. (See Respondent's Brief, p. 17 
n.8) The only issue raised as to the illegality of the search 
is the defendant's standing to assert his constitutional 
rights. (See Respondent's Brief p.21 n.10) This is the first 
time standing has been raised as an issue. 
It is now well established that before a party may 
advance an issue on appeal, the record must clearly show that 
it was timely presented to the trial court in a manner 
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon. Matters not raised in 
the trial court are deemed waived and cannot be raised for the 
first time on appeal. Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 
-3-
653 (Utah App. 1989) In this case because the State raises 
standing for the first time on appeal, the Court should refuse 
to consider the issue and the objection should be deemed 
waived. 
B. Defendant had standing to assert his Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
Even if the Court decides to consider the standing 
issue, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 
L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), supports the conclusion that defendant had 
standing. 
Rakas involved whether individuals who moved to 
suppress evidence seized from an automobile that was searched 
as a getaway vehicle in a robbery. Because the defendants 
claimed no ownership interest in the automobile or the items 
seized the Supreme Court held that they lacked standing to 
assert a violation of Fourth Amendment rights. rd. at 439 
U.S. at 150, 58 L.Ed.2d at 405. 
In discussing the proper standard for non-owner 
standing, the Court modified its previous standard of 
"legitimately on the premises" as per Jones v. United States, 
362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 125, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). The Court 
did not modify or overrule the holding of Jones. In Jones the 
Court allowed an individual who was present at the time of a 
-4-
friend's apartment to object to the search. The friend had 
given Jones a key to it# with which Jones admitted himself on 
the day of the search. 
Although the Court modified the "legitimately on the 
premises* of Jones, standard as too broad, the Court also 
stated: 
We do not question the conclusion of Jones 
that the defendant in that case suffered a 
violation of his personal Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
In this case defendant was given permission to hold 
his birthday party at the Dinaland Aviation hanger by his 
father, the owner. It is quite clear that defendant was more 
than a one time occupant of the premises and therefore had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises. Defendant 
therefore had standing to challenge the legality of the 
officer 's actions, 
C. Bradshaw is dispositive on the issue of 
defendant's right to resist the officer's unlawful entry. 
In State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975), this 
Court was clear in its pronouncement that a statute that made 
it a crime to resist an unlawful arrest is unconstitutional. 
The statute which was the subject of Bradshaw was the former 
Section 76-8-305 which read as follows: 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
when he intentionally interfered with a person 
-5-
recognized to be a law enforcement official 
seeking to effect an arrest or detention of 
himself or another regardless of whether there 
is a legal basis for the arrest* 
The State attempts to distinguish Bradshaw by stating 
that the language recognizing the right to resist an unlawful 
arrest is dicta. This argument fails for several reasons. 
First, the very language that concerned the Court most in 
Bradshaw was "regardless of whether there is a legal basis for 
the arrest." Bradshaw, 541 P.2d at 801. This is the very 
language that the State now argues this Court should amend 
back into the statute by judicial fiat. Indeed, the former 
statute is a restatement of the Elson rule that the State is 
now asking the Court to adopt. The Elson rule is stated as 
follows: 
A private citizen may not use force to resist 
a peaceful search by one he knows or has 
reason to believe is, an authorized police 
officer performing hfs duties regardless of 
whether the search is ultimately determined to 
Be illegal; 
See Respondent's brief p.13 
The similarity between the Elson rule and the former 
§76-8-305 compels the conclusion that Bradshaw is dispositive 
to the outcome of this appeal. Under Bradshaw defendants 
conviction must be reversed. The only alternative is for this 
Court to overrule Bradshaw* 
D% Bradshaw v, State is still good law» 
The State is asking the Court to distinguish Bradshaw 
on the vagueness issue and to adopt the rurla of Elson v„ 
State, 659 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Alaska 1983). Bradshaw, however;, 
is still good law and should not be modified. 
The Bradshaw court's chief concern was based upota the 
factual background of the case. The defendant in Bradshaw 
was accosted by the officer for driving on suspensibn without 
first inquiring from the defendant whether or not he possessed 
a valid license. The defendant in fact did have a valid 
license in his possession. The defendant then left the scene 
of the initial stop and was followed by the officer who then 
attempted to arrest the defendant for resisting arrest. Id. 
at 800-801. 
As noted in the opinion, the officer's illegal conduct 
precipitated the confrontation that eventually led to an 
innocent citizen's arrest. 1]3. at 803 t«J* Henroid 
concurring) Had the officer acted as he was trained to act, 
the defendant would never have been put in jeopardy for 
resisting. 
The right to use force to resist an unlawful search or 
arrest has long been recognized at common law. Regina v. 
Tooley, 2 Ld. Raymond Rep. 1296, 1301 (QB 1709), Bad Elk v. 
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United States, 177 U.S. 52£* 20 S.Ct. 729, 44 L.Ed, 874 
(1900). Although several jurisdictions have abrogated the 
right for expediency purposes:, defendant disputes the State's 
statement that the "modern view" abrogating the right has been 
adopted by a clear majority of states. See Annot. 44 ALR3d 
1078 (1972)• 
In Brown v. City of Oklahoma City, 721 P.2d 1346 (Ok 
App. 1986), the State of Oklahoma argued virtually the same 
position that is advanced by the State in this case. In 
summary up the State's argument the Court stated: 
Various reasons have been advanced for 
limiting the common law right of resistance 
but the principal hypothesis is that force 
begates force, as one court put it, and 
"violence is not only invited but can be 
expected," as another court stated it. 
(Citations omitted) 
721 P.2d at 1346. Rejecting the argument, the Court 
stated: 
We do not, however, think this type of 
reasoning is sound. The existence of a right 
to resist should not depend on whether it is 
prudent for the individual to exercise it. If 
the law enforcement officer is engaged in the 
commission of a crime or is trespassing on 
one's person or property, it makes no sense to 
us that the rights of the victim of such 
unlawful acts should be less than those he has 
if the wrongdoer is jnot a police officer* 
The principal we embrace, however, is 
one that reaches a rational compromise between 
competing interests - one that does not exalt 
unlawful police authority over individual 
rights. For in the final analysis if our 
government is to be in fact what we 
continually proclaim it to be in theory - one 
of laws and not men - The freedom to refuse 
to obey a paternity unlawful order of a police 
officer and the freedom to resist his 
trespasses, his unlawful efforts to seize 
property and effect illegal arrest is 
fundamental and must remain involate. 
Ld. at 1352 
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals decision is in line with 
several U.S. Supreme Court decisions. As stated in Frank v. 
State of Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 364, 79 S.Ct. 804, 807, 3 
L.Ed.2d 877 (1959): 
[T]wo protections emerge from the broad 
constitutional proscription of official 
invasion. The first of these is the right to 
be secure from intrusion into personal 
privacy, the right to shut the door on 
officials of the state unless their entry is 
under property authority of law. The second, 
and intimately related protection, is self 
protection: the right to resist unauthorized 
entry which has as its design the securing of 
information to fortify the coercive power of 
the state against the individual. (Emphasis 
added.) 
See also Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 83 S.Ct. 1240, 10 
L.Ed.2d 349, 355 (1963) (saying "obviously, however, one 
cannot be punished for failure to obey a police officer if 
that command is itself violative of the constitution.*) 
-9 
In the case at hand the State has failed to provide 
sufficient justification for modifying or limiting the holding 
of Bradshaw, Any move toward the Elson rule would necessarily 
impinge upon every citizens constitutional rights and would 
actually encourage sloppy, heavy handed police tactics. 
In this case it was the officerfs heavy handed method 
of shoving his way into the Dinaland Aviation hanger without 
first issuing a verbal warning that led to the confrontation. 
(Trial Court's Findings of Fact 11 & 12) Chad Gardiner did 
what many citizens would do when shoved after asking if the 
officer had a warrant, he physically resisted• Should he now 
be punished even though his only alleged crime was to resist 
what is conceded to be an unlawful, warrantless search? 
Bradshaw and the better reasoned cases answer the question 
with a resounding no* When police officers are allowed to act 
illegally and thereby qoad an otherwise law abiding citizen 
into a confrontation that subjects the citizen to punishment 
under the eriminal law, individual rights take a back seat to 
considerations of expediency and convenience. Although no one 
wishes to encourage physical resistance to illegal actions of 
police officers, innocent citizens should not be subject to 




THE OFFICER'S USE OF UNNECESSARY FORCE REOUIRES 
ACQUITTAL EVEN UNDER THE ELSON RULE, 
The State argues in its brief that defendant failed to 
establish or present evidence as to how> the officer used 
excessive or unnecessary force. Defendant will not belabor 
the issue by once again citing the relevant portions of the 
record but would point out to the Court the following factors: 
First# the officer never gave defendant a verbal 
warning to roove out of the way before shoving the defendant 
with such force as to knock him over a table. Second, prior 
to being shoved, the defendant did not take any physical 
action against the officer* Finally, by all witnesses 
accounts it was the officer who used force first after a 
peaceful request by the defendant that the officer produce a 
warrant. 
The issue of unnecessary force is both a factual and 
legal issue. The Utah Code of Criminal Procedure spells out 
when an officer may use force to effectuate an arrest* U*C*A* 
§77-7-7 provides: 
If a person is being arrested and flees or 
forcibly resists after being informed of the 
intention to make the arrest, the person 
arresting may use reasonable force to effect 
the arrest* 
-11-
U.C.A. §77-7-6 provides: 
Manner of making arrests: The person making 
the arrest shall inform the person being 
arrested of his intention, cause and authority 
to arrest him. 
The statute lists exceptions which l^a not apply in 
this case. It is imperative -to note tnat both statutory 
section require that a person being arrested receive a verbal 
notice or warning before force is allowed. There is nothing^ 
in the record to support the officers resorting to force 
without first giving the defendant verbal notice to step aside 
or face arrest. Because the officer used force before it was 
necessary, the use of force was therefore unnecessary within 
the meaning of Elson v. State, supra, and defendant should be 
acquitted, 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons the defendant respectfully 
requests that the Court reverse the decision of the Court of 
Appeals and remand to the trial court with instructions to 
acquit defendant. 
DATED this £*** daY of March, 1990. 
McRAE & DeLAND 
HARRY H / S O 
Attorney for Appellant 
U-
- 1 2 -
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OBSTRUCTING GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS 
Section Section 
76-6-306. interfere!** with peace officer 764-314. Threatening elected officials — 
making lawful arrest "Elected official" defined. 
76-8406. Obstructing justke. 76-6-316. Threatening elected officials — 
76-6-313. Threatening elected officials — Penalties for assault 
Commission of assault 
76-8-301. Interference with public servant 
Constitutionality. 
ThiB section is not unconstitutionally vague. 
State v. Theobald, 645 P.2d 60 (Utah 1962). 
76-8*305. Interference with peace officer making lawful 
arrest 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care, should have knowledge, that a peace officer is 
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of himself or another and inter-
feres with such arrest or detention by use of force or by use of any weapon. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-305, enacted by L. I 76-6-305), relating to interference with law 
1961, ch. 62, t 1. enforcement official seeking to detain 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1981, ch. 62, J 1 interferor or another, and enacted new 
repealed old § 76-6-305 (L. 1973, ch. 196, i 76-6-305. 
76*8*306. Obstructing justice. 
(1) A person is guilty of an offense if, with intent to hinder, prevent, or 
delay the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of 
another for the commission of a crime, he: 
(a) knowing an offense has been committed, conceals it from a magis-
trate; 
(b) harbors or conceals the offender, 
(c) provides the offender a weapon, transportation, disguise, or other 
means for avoiding discovery or apprehension; 
(d) warns the offender of impending discovery or apprehension; 
(e) conceals, destroys, or alters any physical evidence that might aid in 
the discovery, apprehension, or conviction of the person; 
00 obstructs by force, intimidation, or deception anyone from perform-
ing an act that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, or 
conviction of the person; or 
(g) having knowledge that a law enforcement officer has been autho-
rized or has applied for authorization undo1 either Section 7?-23a~t0 or 
77-23a-15 to intercept a wire, electronic, or oral communication, gives 
notice or attempts to give notice of the possible interception to any person. 
(2) An offense under Subsection QXa) through (!) is a class B misdemeanor, 
unless the actor knows that the offender committed a capital offense or a 
felony of the first degree, in which case it is a second degree felony. 
136 
ABBOT, BY WHOM, AND HOW MADE 77-74 
of an emergency, whan probable cause exists, a magistrate may orally 
authorise a peaoe (Acer to arrest a parson for a public offense, and there-
after, aa soon aa practical, an information shall be lied against the person 
arrested. 
History* C 1958, 77-7-4, enacted by L Croes~Referea*ea. 
198% eh. 16,12. Assault la presents of magistrate, 77-3-10. 
77-7-&. Issuance of warrant — Time arrests may be made. A magis-
trate may issue a warrant for arrest upon finding probable cause to believe 
that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense. If the 
offense charged is: 
(1) A felony, the arrest upon a warrant may be made at any time of 
the day or night; or 
(2) A misdemeanor, the arrest upon a warrant can be made at night 
only if the magistrate has endorsed authorization to do so on the warrant 
History: C. 19% 77-7-5, enacted by L «A CJ8 Arrest 151. 
1980, ch. 15,11 5 AmJor 2d 766, Arrest 179. 
_ „ ,
 M . Time at which la arrest Is made aa affect-
Collator*! References.
 i n g lta j^f^ w lability for making lt> S 
Arrest <S=» S7. ALR1850. 
77-7-6. Manner of making arrest. The person making the arrest shall 
inform the person being arrested of his intention, cause and authority to 
arrest him/ Such notice shall not be required when: 
(1) There is reason to believe the notice will endanger the life or safety 
of the officer or another person or will likely enable the party being 
arrested to escape; 
(2) The person being arrested is actually engaged in the commission of, 
or an attempt to commit, an offense; or 
(3) The person being arrested is pursued immediately after the commis-
sion of an offense or an escape. 
History* C. 1963» 77-7-6, enacted by L Collateral] 
lSSO.dLlMa Arres tee* 
^ , ~ * «A CIS Arrest H 4$, 47,48. 
^ T ^ T T L ^M . ^ ^ SAmJtaraifSMSe,ArrestH«*-tt 
Dogs need ia kw enforcement, immunity 
from BamHty far injury by, 1S-1 -L 
DEaSIONS UNDER FORjiraUW 
aura? ejnrass assy BS anouov wnore xacso snvwmsj esnansssMSi 01 
Private persona were net reojeired to f i fe ••Tf were related to sheriff's 
nolieoaf t & inteattan * sxrest defendant thereof, aftluea* private air 
end Mo unrfirtejits hi otamo, whom lottos, ronidnotsof eoosiy, onold foOow,saj.eassyo 
when trot 000m* were engaged in commission by nee of each 
of criminal act People f. Coofhaa (18S6) IS who committed robbery. 8Ute v. Marfan 
U58.44PS4. (1900)aUia idP5S7. 
77-7-7. Force in making arrest. If a person is being arrested and flees 
or forcibly resists after being informed of the intention to make the arrest, 
57 
77-74 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PEOCEDURE 
the person arresting may use reasonable force to effect the arrest Deadly 
force may be used only as provided in section 76*2-401 
History; C. 1953, 77-7-7, enacted by L Degree of force that may be employed in 
1980, eh. 15, f 1 arresting one charged with a misdemeanor, 
42 ALR1200. 
Crose-Refereneee. Dispute over custody as affecting charge of 
Force which peace officer may use in mak- obstructing or resisting arrest, 8 ALR 1290. 
ing arrest, 76-2-404. Excessive force used in accomplishing law-
; ^ L Pe*§« « « « * • liability for death pr per-
Arrest $=> 68. tonal Injuries caused hy intentional force in 
6A CJS Arrest} 49. arresting misdemeanant, 88 ALR 8d 238. 
5 AmJur 2d 766-778, Arrest {{ 80-86. what constitutes offense of obstructing or 
Deadly force in attempting to arrest flee- resisting officer, 48 ALR 746. 
ing felon, right of peace officer to use, 88 
ALR 3d 174. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Applicability. Marks v. Sullivan (1893) 9 U 12, 83 P 224, 
Former statute applied to a constable applying 2 Comp. Uws 1888, S 4861. 
serving a writ of restitution for premises. 
77-7-8. Doors and windows may be broken, when. To make an arrest, 
a private person, if the offense is a felony, and in all cases, a peace officer, 
may break the door or window of the building in which the person to be 
arrested is, or in which there are reasonable grounds for believing him to 
be. Before making the break, the person shall demand admission and 
explain the purpose for which admission is desired. Demand and explana-
tion need not be given before breaking under the exceptions in section 
77-7-6 or where there is reason to believe evidence will be secreted or 
destroyed. 
History: C. 1953, 77-7-4 enacted by L. 5 AmJur 2d 774-778, Arrest §i 86-93. 
1980, en. 15, 12. Police officer's power to eater private house 
Collateral References. or incloeure to make arrest, without a war-
Arrest $=» 68. rant, for a suspected misdemeanor, 76 ALR 
6A CJS Arrest H 54-66. 2d 1482. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Felony in progress. therein, and assault with deadly weapon 
Officers could break open doors of building »**>»<*&<** « • »<* justifiable, even though 
at Bight where they had reasonable grounds ** « « n o t * ™ demand admittance and 
U believe a felony waa being committed «*#**» M» pun***. State •. Williams (1917) 
49U&M63F1104. 
77-7-f. Weapon* may be taken from prisoner. Any person making an 
arrest may seize from the person arrested all weapons which he may have 
on or about his person. 
History: C 1953, 77-7*9, enacted by L Crosa*Refereikc*a» 
1980, ch. 15, } 2. Property takes from arrested person, 
receipt for, 77-24-5. 
58 
